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Abstract 
With an emphasis on government intervention that hinders market forces in currency 
movements, this paper presents a nuanced investigation of the degree and dynamics of 
flexibility in China’s exchange rate regime. A high-frequency data model is 
developed to more accurately detect the extent to which the Chinese currency is 
market-driven. This indicator is then utilized in a Markov switching model to examine 
shifts in RMB regime flexibility. The results suggest a moderate increase in exchange 
rate flexibility since the 2005 reform. Additionally, two switching states are captured, 
and possible driving factors are discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
China’s exchange rate policy has been the subject of much debate during the past 
decade. The early debate focused on whether the renminbi (RMB) was undervalued 
and the possible consequences thereof. More recently, however, discussions of the 
appropriate institutional arrangements for the Chinese currency have become 
prominent. A major aspect of the debate concerns the degree of flexibility of the 
Chinese exchange rate regime, which is the essential feature of exchange rate regime 
classification. 
China maintained an exchange rate pegged to the US dollar from 1994 to 2005. 
Despite problems with an enduring, rigid dollar peg, some scholars maintain that 
China should continue the dollar peg because increased flexibility might result in 
deflation as it had in Japan (e.g., McKinnon, 2006, 2007; McKinnon and Schnabl, 
2009, 2012). Arguing against continuation of the dollar peg, Roberts and Tyers (2003) 
demonstrate that in the face of external shocks, a flexible exchange rate regime would 
help China avoid the harmful consequences of a fixed exchange rate policy. For 
instance, it helps to reduce currency market speculation (Eichengreen, 2004, 2007). 
Both Obstfeld (2007) and Roubini (2007) contend that the large, modernized, diverse 
Chinese economy and eventual convertibility with open capital markets require 
exchange rate flexibility. Support for greater flexibility in China is also voiced by 
Bernanke (2005), Frankel (2005), Roubini and Setser (2005), Prasad et al. (2005), 
Goldstein and Lardy (2006), and Morrison and Labonte (2013), among others.  
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In response to international calls for change, the People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC), the Chinese central bank, announced in July 2005 the end of the dollar peg 
and a shift to a market-based, managed floating rate regime. A flexible mechanism is 
to be phased in by allowing the RMB to move within a narrow band around a central 
parity rate that is determined with reference to market makers’ opinions, movements 
of a basket of world currencies, and macroeconomic conditions. Although this 
experiment was disrupted in mid-2008 with the onset of the global financial crisis, in 
June 2010, the PBOC announced that it would "proceed further with reform of the 
RMB exchange rate regime and increase the RMB exchange rate flexibility." 
China’s move to a more flexible exchange rate system, if completed, is 
significant because, as the second largest economy in the world, China has become 
increasingly important in international financial markets. However, China is 
internationally noted for intervening in the foreign exchange market, which causes the 
exchange rates to fail to reflect resource scarcity. The ensuing distortionary effects on 
international trade and capital movements are grave and are often cited as major 
contributing factors to global imbalances. While enhanced flexibility in China’s 
exchange rate regime may mitigate the effects of exchange rate misalignment, it 
might also indicate greater market orientation, which could be helpful in attaining a 
sound exchange rate policy over the long run. Furthermore, the market orientation of 
Chinese exchange rate policy also increases the likelihood that the RMB will become 
an international currency (Eichengreen, 2011).  
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Meanwhile, it is also well known that the reforms have been largely 
government administered when they do not always act on their public 
pronouncements.  
In foreign exchange policy, this discrepancy is best known as fear of floating 
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2002), that is, countries who claim a floating exchange rate 
regime do not actually allow their currencies to fluctuate with changing economic 
conditions. Hence, a country’s de jure exchange rate regime could be quite different 
from the de facto regime, a phenomenon that is widespread, particularly in the 
emerging markets. In this light, China’s high profile reform announcements warrant 
careful examination (Eichengreen, 2007; Frankel, 2009). To detect the discrepancy 
between policy words and deeds, it is necessary and desirable to design a proper 
measure of exchange rate flexibility to gauge the de facto Chinese exchange rate 
regime and, hence, help us detect if fear of floating exists in China.  
A good measure of exchange rate flexibility is also instrumental for capturing 
the evolution of a country’s exchange rate regime because the selection of an 
exchange rate regime is a continuous process. Given that the degree of flexibility is 
the essential feature of an exchange rate arrangement, the regime that China operates 
during different periods may be defined in terms of the degree of flexibility, thus the 
flexibility index is also instrumental to improve our understanding of China’s 
exchange rate regime selection process. 
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Earlier studies generally examine exchange rate flexibility in terms of the 
statistical property of nominal exchange rates (Lanyi and Suss, 1982; Barr, 1984). 
Recent research however puts an increasing emphasis on the indications of economic 
forces behind exchange rate changes, e.g. Girton and Roper (1977), Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002) and Levy Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005), with one common feature 
as they are all monthly based. However, this may prevent them from producing more 
accurate results as the effects of intervention may be offset during the month. Thus, a 
higher frequency based method is very much needed. To this end, we marry the merits 
of the existing studies to construct a new flexibility index for RMB featuring the post-
reform period. A market-oriented principle was closely followed in the sense that the 
flexibility index is designed to provide a plausible estimate of the extent to which the 
Chinese government allows the RMB to be driven by market forces.  
To build the daily flexibility index, we utilize exchange rate data from the 
largest Chinese commercial bank dealing in foreign exchange (Bank of China) and the 
New York Federal Reserve. The results suggest that there were sizable increases in 
flexibility immediately after the reform announcement; however, this process was 
disrupted when the adverse effects of the global financial crisis emerged in mid-2008. 
The PBOC quietly re-pegged the RMB to the dollar, and the flexibility index 
consequently dropped dramatically, indicating that Chinese intervention thwarted the 
market forces driving the exchange rate. This low-flexibility policy was enforced until 
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March 2010, when the central bank announced the re-institution of exchange rate 
reform.  
We then examine China’s exchange rate policy by investigating changes in the 
flexibility of the RMB exchange rate in a regime switching setting. This newly 
constructed daily flexibility indicator is applied in a Markov switching model to 
examine whether and when there are regime breaks in  the RMB exchange rate 
flexibility. The results obtained through the Markov switching model suggest that the 
dynamics of RMB flexibility have passed through two distinct switching states 
wherein the parameters of the high- and low-flexibility states differ noticeably. The 
timing of these regime shifts provides evidence of fear of floating in China. For the 
sample period as a whole, the degree of RMB flexibility in China is relatively low 
despite the reforms, reflecting the gradual pace of China’s transition to a floating 
exchange rate system. Overall, the Chinese government still exerts considerable 
control over the foreign exchange market, whereas China is edging towards greater 
exchange rate flexibility, especially in the wake of the global financial crisis.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to 
the construction and analysis of a new exchange rate flexibility index. Section 3 
examines structural changes in the Chinese exchange rate regime through a Markov 
switching model. Section 4 provides summary and concluding remarks.  
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2. Measuring Flexibility: A High Frequency Model  
 Prior Studies 
Earlier studies generally view exchange rate flexibility on the basis of the 
statistical properties of nominal exchange rates, such as variance, standard deviations, 
(Lanyi and Suss, 1982; Barr, 1984).  Important improvements lately emerge to take 
into account indications of the economic influences that underlie exchange rate 
movements. On an absolute basis, a large scale of exchange rate movements, or high 
exchange rate volatility, alone is a symbol of high flexibility. However, on a relative 
basis, this claim is supported only when there is sizable pressure on that currency 
during the time period. The idea of ‘relative fashion’ is particularly emphasized in 
recent studies. For instance, Calvo and Reinhart (2002) propose a variance ratio index 
constructed to capture variation in the exchange rate relative to policy instruments. 
Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) build a flexibility indicator utilizing the 
volatilities of exchange rates and foreign reserves.  
Another strand of the flexibility literature builds on the concept of EMP, i.e. 
the exchange market pressure; its models are accordingly referred to as EMP-based 
models.
1
 EMP can be utilized to assess the proportion of the pressure that is mitigated 
by movements in the exchange rate alone. These studies have usually assumed that 
the greater the pressure alleviation, the more flexible is the regime. In addition to 
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using EMP in the ratio analysis, an alternative approach is to deploy EMP directly in 
the econometric estimation of the degree of exchange rate flexibility. Studies in this 
group mainly follow the pioneering work of Frankel and Wei (1994). However, 
scholars have different views about how EMP series should be constructed and the 
effectiveness of the proxies used. For example, Willet et al. (2012) point out that not 
all changes in foreign reserves, which is generally used as a key building block of 
EMP, are government interventions and sometimes official interventions are ‘leaning 
with the wind’ which involves no reserve changes.  
The models discussed above can generate a time series of flexibility index, 
which provides a useful summary of the evolving nature of a country’s exchange rate 
system. They also enable a look into indications of the economic influences including 
government policy that underlie exchange rate movements, or the lack thereof.  
Nevertheless, these models suffer from a common drawback, that is, the 
reliance on monthly data to compute the flexibility indexes. Such dependency is 
problematic because government intervention is usually conducted in a higher 
frequency, e.g. daily. Accordingly, monthly average data may camouflage the 
frequency and effects of government intervention. To overcome this problem, we 
develop a high-frequency approach based on daily data to measure exchange rate 
flexibility.  
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High Frequency Flexibility Indexes: Construction  
In China, foreign exchange transactions are administered by the Chinese Foreign 
Exchange Trading System (CFETS), which is a computerized national network that 
publishes the central parity rate (CPR) of the RMB against the US dollar at 9:15 AM 
(Beijing time) each business day. The CPR rate, which is set by the Chinese central 
bank, considers three influences: the individual rates offered by official market 
makers, international currency movements and macroeconomic conditions. Because 
this rate-setting process is led by the Chinese central bank, the CPR is considered as 
the official exchange rate, which then provides a benchmark rate for the Chinese 
foreign exchange system. The rate-setting process also reveals the fact that exchange 
rate rigidity in China is often the result of government control that shadows the 
influence of market forces and therefore, it is necessary and appropriate to define the 
flexibility of exchange rate in terms of the extent to which a monetary authority 
allows the market to influence the price of the country’s currency in the foreign 
exchange market.  
           In this paper, by comparing the variability of this official rate with the market 
rate, a gap could be revealed, which may serve as a measure indicating government 
intervention in the currency movements.
2
  Through this, one may gauge the extent to 
which the RMB is allowed to move in line with supply and demand forces. After 
searching for a proxy that reflects the market, we selected a market rate series for the 
RMB/USD that is published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (Federal 
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Reserve or FED hereafter), which uses data from a sample of market participants. 
These data are the noon buying rates of the RMB against the US dollar in New York 
on business days for cable transfers payable in foreign currencies. This series can 
provide useful information for our research because it is highly unlikely that the 
Chinese government can control the exchange rate in New York.  
However, by its nature the official central parity rate tends to be of low 
variability, which limits the indicative accuracy of the changeability differential 
between this rate and the market rate as a flexibility index.
3
 This prompts us to search 
for a domestic exchange rate whose variability can be meaningfully compared to that 
of the RMB exchange rates in New York.  
We choose the exchange rate quoted by the Bank of China (BOC) because it is 
the earliest and the largest player in the foreign exchange market in China and its rate 
series is representative of the rates offered by commercial banks in China. 
4
 It is 
important to note that Chinese trading rules require commercial banks to conduct their 
market transactions based on the CPR, and the quoted rates must be within a 
government-specified band, which was initially +/- 3‰ and has recently expanded to 
+/- 2% around the central parity rate.
5
 So the BOC exchange rates are in fact semi-
controlled. However, with the development of China’s financial reforms, the BOC 
increasingly has its own commercial interests and its rates become gradually more 
driven by market influences. As such, comparing the variability of this semi-
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government influenced rate to that of the Federal Reserve rate may provide useful 
information on the extent of RMB flexibility.  
           Use of the ratio may have another advantage over the other competing 
methods. It is well known that currency prices are influenced by common 
international factors or events despite its own characteristics. In this light, the 
volatility ratio helps to analyse the relative strength of market forces transmitting to 
the movements of the RMB exchange rates, which coincidences with the essence of 
our definition of the currency flexibility measure.Based on these comparisons, we 
then estimate the high-frequency model to produce flexibility indicators for the RMB. 
The procedure involves the following steps (refer to Eq.1). First, we calculate the 
standard deviation of returns of the RMB/USD rates from the BOC (BOC rates) in the 
last 21 business days (including the current business day)
6
 to proxy exchange rate 
volatility of the current business day. Next, the daily relative volatility ratio is 
obtained by dividing the volatility of the BOC exchange rates by that of the market-
based exchange rates.  
Finally, to index these ratios, we take the base as of January 4, 2006 when the 
central parity rate was officially installed. This means that the value of the flexibility 
ratio on that day is made to be 100, and the reference base is then applied to every 
daily flexibility ratio in the series: 
                                                   Flexibility Index=100*
Relative Volatility Ratio
Reference Base
                     (1) 
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Because the pegged RMB/USD exchange rate is upheld before July 21, 2005, 
the rolling calculation of the daily flexibility index begins on July 22, 2005, the first 
business day after the reform was announced, and ends on March 29, 2013, the latest 
day in our sample period. We denote the computed daily index of RMB flexibility as 
BOC_FED and plot the series in the following figure, while the black line represents 
the mean flexibility value as 115.3.   
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Figure 1.  The Exchange Rate Flexibility of RMB 
            It is clearly seen from the figure that the index has its ups and downs during 
the sample period, which confirms previous findings that the RMB flexibility was 
enhanced after the reforms, but the process was disrupted by the outbreak of two 
crises. For instance, starting from mid-2008 until the second reform announcement, 
the flexibility index was hardly seen beating its mean value, suggesting the Chinese 
authority tightened exchange rate control when it feared that the global financial crisis 
posed a threat to the export sector. A similar decrease was also captured when the 
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European sovereign debt crisis emerged. However this time the low flexibility phase 
did not last long.  
In addition to confirming the commonly held market perceptions, our high-
frequency data model offers richer information about currency flexibility in China. 
For example, since the 2005 reform China’s exchange rate management has been 
subject to several changes. Under the regime currently in place, the Chinese monetary 
authorities mainly deploy two tools to prevent or restrict undesirable fluctuations in 
the exchange rate: one is the government controlled central parity rate and the other is 
the band in which the RMB rate is allowed to fluctuate in the marketplace. Initially, 
the central parity rate was based on the previous day’s closing price. This practice 
would continue the momentum of previous exchange rate changes such that 
cumulative exchange rate variation and level changes could be quite sizable. Fearing 
rapid appreciation of the exchange rate and increasing variation, the government 
changed this pricing rule on January 4, 2006 and reset the central parity rate on the 
opening of every business day rather than simply using previous day’s closing rate.7 
As a result, though the BOC_FED index exhibits a surge after the reform
8
, it sharply 
decreased in January 2006. These developments are well captured by the behavior of 
the high frequency data flexibility indexes.  
The fact that the two exchange rates are drawn from different markets may 
prompt some doubts on the role played by capital control policies, as it is widely held 
that Chinese authority has adopted tight control on the capital flows, which largely 
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disrupted the link between onshore and offshore markets. Therefore, some may argue 
that the volatility difference in the two exchange rate series should be considered as a 
measure of capital control intensity rather than an exchange rate flexibility as we 
discussed above.  
           While we do acknowledge that there is some effect of capital control on the 
exchange rates from a theoretical perspective, the de facto intensity of this impact is 
however much in question empirically. Aizenman and Sengupta (2013) find that 
capital account openness plays no significant role in China’s trilemma configurations9, 
which confirms a widely held view that the effects of China’s capital controls are not 
omniscient, but are decaying off over time. In fact, arbitrage between China and rest 
of the world is not entirely impossible and may be prevailing at some point (Ma and 
McCauley 2008, Galati et al. 2007).  Yu (2008) notes that a large portion of China’s 
large trade surplus is nothing but hot money in disguise, aimed at evading capital 
controls. Similar doubts have also been raised on the FDI inflows. Moreover, 
compared to the changing volatility ratio index , it is worthy to point out that the 
Chinese authority does not change its stance on the capital control very often, the fact 
of which is clearly evident from the annual IMF report for the time period in 
consideration.    
Though we cannot fully rule out the impact of capital controls on our index, it 
is important to note that exchange rate flexibility is defined here as the extent to 
which the authority allows the market forces to impact the price of RMB, treating all 
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forms of control policies equal, which include but are not limited to the direct sell (or 
purchase) in the FX market, ‘window guidance’, and the capital control policies as 
well. Put in other words, we are more interested in the end-product of the ‘managed’ 
floating rate system that China adopts but do not really differentiate the specific 
‘intervention’ form at the other end.  
While it seems not appropriate to use our volatility difference to proxy the 
intensity of capital controls, it is important to note that exchange rates is one of the 
many economic factors that are impacted by the capital control policies, which in turn 
makes it possible to build alternative measure of the intensity of capital controls. In 
fact, there have been a few well known models in the literature, such as Edison and 
Warnock (2003), Chinn and Ito (2008).  
 
         
The companying EMP 
In light of the recent exchange rate flexibility models, it seems plausible to double-
check the usefulness of our flexibility index by looking at the companying EMP.  
           To this end, we follow Klaasen and Jager’s (2011) method in calculating a 
daily-based measurement of EMP. Compared to the other popular approaches, 
Klaasen and Jager’s (2011) method stands out as this measure is consistent with the 
very definition of EMP and does not rely on any exchange rate model. Another 
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crucial feature of their method is that the measure is consistent across frequencies. 
Thus, it is straightforward to aggregate the daily EMPs to obtain a monthly measure.
 
 
In Klaasen and Jager’s (2011) study, the specific form of EMP is written as 
follows, 
                                      ( )
d
t t i t t c tEMP S w i i w c                                       (2) 
where tS is the nominal exchange rate change at time t, defined as the 
domestic currency price (RMB) of one unit of foreign currency (USD); ti is the 
domestic interest rate; 
d
ti stands for the interest rate level if exchange rate objective is 
not a determinant. As shown in Klaasen and Jager (2011), 
d
ti can be reasonably 
simplified by using the foreign interest rate level as the proxy; iw is the weight of 
relative interest rate level ( )
d
t ti i  and cw  is the weight of the scaled intervention.  
We use the overnight interest rate from PBOC and Federal Reserve to 
represent the interest rate level in China and the US respectively. The weights of iw  
and cw are set equal to the standard deviation of the nominal exchange rate changes to 
that of the interest rate and the scaled intervention component.  
As discussed above, the change of foreign reserve might not serve as a perfect 
proxy for exchange rate intervention. Hence, to better proxy the unobservable central 
bank intervention, we make use of one unique statistic from the PBOC, called ‘funds 
outstanding for foreign exchange’. It can be considered as the result of intervention as 
it mirrors the purchase of foreign assets. To make it more comparable, the level of 
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‘funds outstanding for foreign exchange’ is scaled down by the preceding domestic 
M1. The data for M1 and ‘funds outstanding for foreign reserve’ is collected from 
PBOC. However, as they are only available in monthly frequency, we apply the cubic 
interpolation method to transform them into a daily–based series10.  
Similar to the flexibility index, the EMP series is calculated from July 22, 
2005 to March 29, 2013, and the result is plotted in the following figure.  
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Figure 2. Exchange Market Pressure of RMB 
         It is clear from the above figure that there was an appreciation pressure, i.e. a 
negative EMP, on the RMB during most of the sample period. In contrast to policy 
maker’s intentions, following the 2005 reform, the appreciation pressure exaggerated 
sharply rather than being alleviated, which reflects the prevailing market perception 
that a consistent appreciation of RMB was on its way. A negative EMP was 
maintained until December 2007 when the market panicked about the looming crisis. 
However, the market quickly reversed its course by recognizing that the outlook for 
China’s growth was strong and the RMB was still undervalued. Nevertheless, it is 
18 
 
observed that from mid-2008 to mid-2010, the EMP was close to zero, i.e. indicating 
relatively low appreciation pressure on the RMB. Following the second reform 
announcement, the EMP quickly decreased. Since then it has several brief reversals as 
a result of prevailing market conditions. 
              As discussed above, existing studies have emphasized that high volatility, or 
a relatively high volatility ratio, does not necessarily mean the currency is truly 
flexible. It is necessary to take into account the prevailing pressures. The degree of 
flexibility of one currency is only warranted when there is a considerable level of 
exchange market pressure overhang. Hence, we may visually compare the patterns 
observed in the two figures to check if our flexibility index makes sense.  
           On one hand, during the crisis period, even though there was little pressure on 
the RMB, the flexibility index was in a ‘low’ phase, which supports the claim that 
reform was halted by the Chinese authority and the RMB was not flexible. On the 
other hand, in non-crisis periods, the striking difference in the flexibility index may 
help to locate ‘high’ flexibility phases. Notwithstanding the considerable pressure at 
the time, the several surges of the flexibility index clearly indicate that RMB was 
actually variable, though those periods seem to be rather short-lived. In summary, it 
seems safe to say that the effectiveness of our flexibility index is warranted and RMB 
has undergone several different flexibility phases, revealing more ‘hidden’ dynamics 
than those suggested by existing studies.   
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3. De Facto Regime Switches and Fear of Floating in China  
Sudden changes in government policy may induce drastic breaks in the behavior of 
economic variables (Hamilton, 1989; Sims and Zha, 2006). Such breaks often mean 
the typical behavior of a variable switches to a very different one, and hence may 
generate fundamental repercussions. China’s exchange rate policy is a case in point. 
During the sample period the Chinese authorities have initialed two rounds of reforms 
of the exchange rate system, allowing greater room for market forces to influence the 
RMB price, including that against the US dollar. This implies that, during the period 
under examination the RMB rate switched from a pegged to a managed flexible rate 
regime, and back and forward twice. During this period, the behavior of the RMB rate 
and the property of China’s exchange rate system had both exhibited distinct patterns.    
Given the importance of regime switches, researchers logically would like to 
detect the regime changes as they happen so that they may find out the implications of 
the regime break and to design suitable responses accordingly. However, it is 
unrealistic to expect a single, linear model to characterize all the distinct behaviors of 
the variables in different regimes. In contrast, the Markov regime switching (MRS) 
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models prove appropriate in capturing more complex dynamic patterns of the 
variables in question. 
The Markov regime switching models have found wide applications in 
economics and finance (Ang and Timmermann, 2012). Among the pioneering studies, 
Hamilton (1989) applies the MRS model to research into the US business cycle. Many 
papers applying the methodology then follow suit. Recent studies have also deployed 
the MRS models to explain exchange rate behavior, e.g. Engle and Hamilton (1990), 
Engle (1994), Bollen et al. (2000), Bergman and Hansson (2005), Ichiue and Koyama 
(2011).  
For our research interests, in addition to capture regime changes in the 
Chinese exchange rate policy, the Markov switching model has another helpful 
property; it allows the detection of the timing of regime shifts, which would help to 
resolve the problem noted by Frankel and Xie (2010) and identify proper ‘break-
points’ to differentiate sub-periods. Furthermore, analysis of the regime shifts can 
help us achieve a better understanding of a critical attribute of the Chinese exchange 
rate regime. Exemplified by fear of floating, studies have pointed out that countries do 
not always conform to their public announcements, i.e. there is considerable 
differences between policy announcement and its implementation. As one key 
objective of this paper is to find out exactly when the policy shift starts to impact the 
behavior of the RMB/USD exchange rate, we cannot solely rely on the de jure dates. 
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By detecting the timing of RMB’s regime shift, the Markov model would help capture 
the critical features of China’s exchange rate policy in a time of economic transition.     
Given the findings in the previous section, we assume that there have been two 
flexibility regimes, i.e. a high-flexibility regime and a low-flexibility regime. As the 
flexibility is built on the standard deviation of exchange rates, we only need to use the 
mean (constant) coefficient to differentiate these two regimes while the variance 
parameter is assumed to be non-switching. Also, to take account the common 
dependence of the second moments of the exchange rates, we include an AR(1) term 
in our model. Accordingly, the Markov switching model could be written as follows 
and we report the estimation results in Table 1.
11
  
           1 1_ (s ) ( _ (s ))t t i t t tFle Index Fle Index                                  (3) 
where _ tFle Index is the BOC_FED flexibility index at time t. It is conditional on an 
unobservable variable ts , which has two possible values: 1ts  (Low-flexibility) and 
2ts  (High-flexibility);  denotes the mean parameter depending on the regime at 
time t which is assumed to be changeable in those two states; t is the error term, 
following the usual iid assumption.  
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Table 1.  Markov Regime Switching Results of Flexibility Index 
Panel A Regime Varying Coefficients 
 Regime 1 Regime2 
Constant 85 (5.53***) 155 (10.09***) 
Regime Invariant Coefficients 
AR(1) 0.99 (267.88***) 
Log (SIGMA) 2.06 (123.20***) 
Log Likelihood -6354.92 
Panel B 
 
 
Constant Transition Probabilities 
P(i,k)=P(s(t)=k|s(t-1)=i 
P(1,1)=99.1% P(2,1)=0.8% 
P(1,2)=0.9% P(2,2)=99.2% 
Constant Expected Durations (Days) 
Regime 1 125.9 
Regime 2 114.4 
Transition Matrix Parameters 
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P11-C 4.83 (13.36 ***) 
P21-C -4.73 (-13.05***) 
Notes: This table presents the results of the two-state Markov switching model of the BOC_FED 
flexibility index. In Panel A, we report the estimated coefficients for the regime-varying and regime-
invariant variables, with the corresponding z-statistics in parentheses. Panel B reports the constant 
transition probabilities between the two regimes, the expected duration for each regime, and the 
transition matrix parameters. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.   
Several interesting results emerge from the estimation of the MRS model. 
Firstly, it helps us to formally test regime switches in the flexibility index that we 
construct. We make use of a likelihood ratio (LR) test proposed by Garcia and Perron 
(1996). The null hypothesis is there is no regime shifts (the flexibility index is better 
reproduced by a linear autoregressive model) against the alternative of the presence of 
regime switches (the flexibility index is better accounted by the MRS model). The LR 
is calculated as follows: 
                                                       2 | lnL lnL |MRS ARLR                                                           (4) 
where ln MRSL and ln ARL denote the log likelihood of the MRS and the linear 
autoregressive model, respectively. As shown in Table 2, the LR test statistic is highly 
significant at the 1% significance level. Based on Davies (1987) critical values, we 
reject the null and confirm the regime shifts in RMB flexibility.   
Table 2. LR Test Results 
lnLMRS lnLAR LR 
-6354.92 -6721.50 736.16*** 
Notes: Similar to the estimated MRS model, the linear model has an order of one autoregressive term. 
*** indicates significance at 1% level.   
24 
 
Secondly, we provide evidence that the exchange rate flexibility index varies 
markedly between the two regimes. In the low-flexibility state, the coefficient on the 
constant reads 85 and in the high-flexibility state it is shown to be 155. The adoption 
of a managed floating rate regime has helped the RMB achieve an increase in 
flexibility. Of 1805 observation days, 855 days (approximately 47.4%) are in the 
high-flexibility state though mostly in the period before the 2008 global financial 
crisis. 
In contrast to the sharp difference in the mean coefficient, both regimes show 
high regime dependence: it almost has a probability of one to stay in the same regime. 
Moreover, there is little difference in the length of the expected duration of each 
regime. The low-flexibility state reports an expected duration of 125.9 days while the 
expected duration of the high-flexibility is only 11 days shorter.   
Thirdly, we plot the estimated smooth regime probabilities to see when the 
regime switches take place.
 
Though the figure is quite self-explanatory, we report the 
estimated ‘starting’ and ‘ending’ dates of the ‘high-flexibility’ regime in the Table 3. 
The first thing worthy to note is that it confirms the switches that were generally 
presumed by the market. For instance, in the face of the worst financial crisis since 
the Great Depression of the 1930s, China took a cautious stance towards policy 
responses, including exchange rate arrangements. The RMB exchange rate was kept 
inflexible during the global financial crisis period. However, the MRS model report 
different starting and ending dates for the ‘crisis period’. According to the 
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documented dates in Table 3, the ‘high-flexibility’ regime was ended on 25 August 
2008 and resumed on 23 March 2010, while the official resumption of the reform was 
announced on 19 June, 2010, suggesting the de facto regime switch did occur a little 
earlier.
12
 
Secondly, the MRS model reveals more shifts of the RMB flexibility which 
may otherwise remain ‘hidden’. In the case where monetary authorities do not 
publicly announce its intervention operations, we follow studies such as Beine et al. 
(2009), Gnabo et al. (2009), and Dewachter et al. (2014) to make use of Factiva to 
double-check the results from the MRS model. Through search we obtain daily 
Reuters reports on information of the spot foreign exchange market including media 
analysis of the Chinese RMB/ US dollar and other related news. It proves particularly 
useful of some traders’ comments connotative of possible intervention by the Chinese 
monetary authorities. These international reports are usually reliable and often helpful 
for one to identify the ‘surprising’ points relating to the shift of China’s policy regime. 
For all those ‘break points’ that we can identify as the dates when the RMB shifted 
out of the ‘high flexibility’ regime, we could find corresponding reports made by 
traders indicating that there was a high chance that the PBOC had intervened on the 
dates. For instance, the first shift to the ‘low flexibility’ regime is estimated to occur 
on 13 September, 2005. On that day, the Reuters reported that one trader explicitly 
commented that the PBOC was very likely to have intervened as no one else would 
buy the US dollars under the prevailing market conditions. On the other hand, while 
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traders also reported occasions of possible Chinese intervention in the ‘high flexibility’ 
period, the frequency of such occasions is much less than in the ‘low flexibility’ 
period. 
In summary, the estimated dates give sound evidence of fear of floating in 
China. This also suggests that China’s move to greater RMB flexibility is not a one-
off event. Rather, it is a process where the de facto regime switching occurs in a 
gradual manner. 
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Figure 3. Smooth Regime Probabilities  
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Table 3. The Estimated Starting and Ending dates of the ‘High-flexibility’ Regime 
 Starting Date Ending Dates 
1 25 July 2005 12 September 2005 
2 17 October 2005 15 November 2005 
3 13 July 2006 25 August 2008 
4 31 December 2008 9 February 2009 
5 23 March 2010 20 April 2011 
6 5 June 2012 5 July 2012 
Notes: The reported dates are based on the smoothed regime probabilities, estimated from a two-state 
Markov switching model of the BOC_FED flexibility index. 
 
Possible Driving Forces 
For possible drivers of the regime switching of exchange rate flexibility, there is 
currently no consensus in the literature. Here we choose to look into three variables 
that may plausibly affect the dynamics of the exchange rate regime switching. The 
first candidate is the interest rate differential between China and the US, which has 
been persistent and largely in China’s favor over the sample period. It is noticed that 
there is much coverage in both literature and news that the interest rate differential has 
induced arbitrage from international investors, which is further fueled by a one-way 
betting on RMB appreciation. Jongen et al. (2012) and Spronk et al. (2013) have 
shown that the level of interest rate differential plays an important role in determining 
trading strategies in the forex market, which ultimately leads to volatility. Hence, 
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given a higher interest rate differential we would expect to see higher exchange rate 
volatility, which implies a positive relation between the interest rate differential and 
the flexibility index. However, this impact may be dampened by the interventionist 
policy as it pushes the authorities to respond more aggressively when there is a higher 
interest rate differential. Therefore, we only hypothesize that the coefficient of interest 
rate differential displays a regime switching behavior, without specifying the sign of 
the relation.  
The second candidate is the EMP, which is included here for two reasons. On 
one hand, recent studies, such as Frankel and Xie (2010), have used EMP as an 
explanatory variable in econometric estimation to investigate to what extent exchange 
rate flexibility is affected by currency pressures. On the other hand, EMP provides a 
summary indicator of various underlying factors. Aizenman et al. (2012), Aizenman 
and Pasricha (2012) and Feldkircher et al. (2014) have all proposed possible 
determinants of the exchange market pressure. However those variables are only 
measured at a relatively low frequency, such as monthly, quarterly or even annually. 
Intuitively, the interventionist policy predicts a negative relation between EMP and 
the flexibility index as the surge of currency pressure would motivate the authorities 
to smooth exchange rate movements. However, in the ‘high flexibility’ regime, it 
seems plausible to expect that the central bank may refrain itself from doing so or 
make little response to the pressure. Nevertheless, given the fact that the EMP series 
changes sign during the sample period, we do not put constraint on the sign of the 
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relation ex ante but only hypothesize that the flexibility index will respond 
asymmetrically to EMP in the two regimes.  
The third explanatory variable that we consider is sovereign risk perceived by 
investors regarding the Chinese economy. To this end, we make use of the CDS 
spread.
 13
 During most of the sample period under examination, the CDS index is 
quite stable and at a relatively low level. The two drastic increases coincided with the 
two major economic shocks, i.e. the global financial crisis and the European 
sovereign debt crisis. Therefore, it closely tracks the markets’ perception on the 
expected performance of the Chinese economy. Different from the previous two 
variables, the CDS spread is used as an exogenous variable in our model to account 
for the transition probabilities between regimes. Specifically, we hypothesize a 
negative association between the CDS spread and the RMB flexibility index as a 
higher CDS spread would result in a shift out of the high flexibility state. 
            The estimated MRS model could be written as in Equation 5, 
3
1 1 , 1
1
_ (s ) ( _ (s ))t t i t t j j t t
j
Fle Index Fle Index Z      

                       (5) 
where all the variables are defined identically as in the previous estimation. The only 
exception is that we use Z to represent the three possible explanatory variables. The 
estimation results are reported in Table 4.  
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The results generally support our hypotheses regarding the three candidate 
explanatory variables. Firstly, the interest rate differential reports a positive impact on 
the flexibility in both regimes, indicating that during the sample period the interest 
rate differential contributed to the increase of the exchange rate volatility, possibly 
through arbitrage activities. Moreover, the higher coefficient reported from the low 
flexibility regime seems to suggest the impact from the interest rate differential and 
the central bank intervention are both larger in amplitude, though the aggregate effect 
is still positive. However, it is worthy to note that the coefficients in both regimes are 
not statistically significant.  
Secondly, it is reported that EMP has a negative effect on the flexibility in 
both regimes, which might be reconciled with the fact that the Chinese authorities 
have displayed a cautious, maybe over-cautious, approach in preceding the reform. 
The presence of exchange market pressure on the Chinese currency tends to lead to a 
decrease in the authorities’ willingness in increasing the flexibility of the RMB. What 
is more important is that the results confirmed our hypothesis that the flexibility index 
would respond asymmetrically to EMP: compared to the high-flexibility regime, the 
BOC_FED index responded more dramatically, nearly 18 times of the magnitude of 
the effect, in the low-flexibility regime.  
Thirdly, the results imply that the CDS may serve as an early warning signal 
of regime shifts as a higher risk spread lowers the probability of staying in the high-
flexibility state. However, the magnitude of this effect tends to be very limited. 
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Moreover, the high regime dependence once again highlights the fact that the Chinese 
authority still firmly controls the pace of the reform process, or the degree of RMB 
exchange rate flexibility.  
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Table 4. Markov Switching Model with Time-Varying Transition Probability 
Panel A Regime Varying Coefficients 
 Regime 1 Regime2 
Constant 84.3 (5.60***) 154.4 (10.23***) 
Int_Diff(-1) 0.40 (0.95) 0.19 (0.31) 
EMP(-1) -5.13 (-2.45**) -0.29 (-0.47) 
Regime Invariant Coefficients 
AR(1) 0.99 (265.86***) 
Log (SIGMA) 2.05 (122.86***) 
Log Likelihood -6347.00 
Panel B 
 
 
Time-varying Transition Probabilities 
P(i,k)=P(s(t)=k|s(t-1)=i 
P(1,1)=99.2%  P(2,1)=1.2%  
P(1,2)=0.8% P(2,2)=98.8% 
Time Varying Expected Durations (Days) 
Regime 1 127.4 (1.4) 
Regime 2 121.3 (44.6) 
Transition Matrix Parameters 
P11-C 4.85 (13.30***) 
P11-CDS_1YR(-1) 0.02 (-0.81) 
P21-C -5.25 (-10.44***) 
P21-CDS_1YR(-1) 0.017 (2.05**) 
Notes: This table presents the results of the two-state Markov switching model of the BOC_FED 
flexibility index. It is different from Table 1 because the transition probability is assumed to be time 
varying and dependent on CDS. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.   
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4.  Conclusions  
This paper investigates the behavior and dynamics of flexibility of the Chinese 
exchange rate regime since 2005 when the reform was launched to lift the RMB’s 
dollar peg and to phase in a managed floating rate system. Defining currency 
flexibility as the degree of exchange rate variation in a relative term, this research 
examines the extent to which government control have hampered adjustment of the 
RMB exchange rate. Monthly data models prove inadequate for this task since 
government intervention rarely lasts months and an intervention’s effects may be 
offset within the month. We focus on the result of government control, i.e. the market 
exchange rates, and develop flexibility measures based on the daily data. It represents 
a nuanced approach to measuring exchange rate flexibility and yields richer 
information about evolving trait of China’s exchange rate regime. 
A Markov switching model with two states is then estimated utilizing the 
newly built daily flexibility index. The parameters in the high- and low-flexibility 
states differ noticeably for the RMB. In detecting the timing of regime shifts, we 
observe evidence of fear of floating in China. This empirical investigation also sheds 
lights on the possible drivers of the RMB flexibility in different states. The interest 
rate differential seems to have a positive effect on the RMB flexibility in both regimes, 
though the coefficients are not statistically significant. Even though EMP has a 
negative effect on the RMB flexibility in both regimes, the magnitude of the effect 
decreased drastically from the low-flexibility regime to the high-flexibility regime. 
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We also find that the CDS index, which indicates the risk that China is exposed to, 
may serve as an early warning signal for regime shifts of RMB flexibility since a 
higher risk spread lowers the probability of RMB staying in the high-flexibility state. 
Last, while there is evidence of fear of floating in China, it is also true that the RMB 
is making inroads into the problem of lacking flexibility in the exchange rate regime. 
The pace of China’s transition to a managed floating rate system is still slow and the 
government control over the foreign exchange market remains considerable. However, 
the flexibility enhancing process has already started. Along with the country’s 
growing economic and financial might, the cumulative effect of this process on 
international finance could be radical.  
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1
 EMP is an acronym for Exchange Market Pressure. First developed by Girton and Roper (1977), this 
concept has been extended and popularized significantly by scholars, including Roper and Turnovsky 
(1980), Weymark (1997), Eichengreen et al. (1995) and Klaassen and Jager (2011). 
2
 It would be straightforward to deploy official intervention data to calculate the flexibility index. 
However, no publication of such data in China and some proxies have to be chosen. The usual proxy 
for intervention, i.e. changes in foreign reserves is not directly feasible in the Chinese context since 
reserve changes are usually reported in China at low frequency and their changes are often caused by a 
variety of reasons, not necessarily by intervention. Empirically, given the property of time series of 
reserves data, no reliable method can be applied to derive sound daily interpolation. In this light, we 
choose to rely on the information revealed by the exchange rates. 
3
 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this issue.  
4
 The BOC rate is from Bank of China, available in DataStream by 16:15 (GMT) on each business day.   
5
 The fluctuation band was officially announced on July 21, 2005 to be +/- 0.03% around the central 
parity. This was raised to +/- 0.05% from May 21, 2007. From April 16, 2012, the band was expanded 
to +/- 1% and on March 17, 2014 it became +/- 2%.  
6
 We choose 21 days because there are approximately 21 working days in a calendar month. We have 
also tried 10 days and 60 days, the results show no significant difference.   
7 This policy was re-instituted on 11 August 2015 as the PBOC latest effort to improve the central 
parity rate-setting process.   
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8
 Our results show that the first dramatic increase of the flexibility index occurred around October 2005, 
not immediately after the reform date. However, it simply suggests that the Chinese authority has 
proceeded the reform cautiously and it reinforces the fact that our index could offer more information.  
9  The much celebrated ‘Trilemma’ theory states that an open economy at any time may only 
simultaneously choose two out of three potentially desirable objectives: namely the autonomy in 
conducting monetary policy, stable exchange rates and internationally free capital movements. 
Though it was first proposed in the 1960s, the existence of the ‘trade-off’ has gone through 
arduous verification, including some recent studies by Aizenman and his co-authors. 
10 To check the robustness of our daily-based EMP, we’ve calculated the monthly EMP for RMB 
for the sample period using other popular methods, including Weymark (1997), Stavarek (2007). 
We find the results have a high positive correlation with the monthly aggregated EMP using the 
Klaassen and Jager’s (2011) method. We have scaled up the results 100 times to make it more 
compatible to other variables in the following estimation. 
11
 A common estimation procedure is followed in this study and hence the detailed technical 
description was left out. Interested readers can find such information easily in all the aforementioned 
studies. Hamilton (2008) gives excellent review for the MRS model.  
12
 Through Factiva, we find that on 7 April 2010, the headline news was that in the meeting soon to be 
held between the presidents of China and the USA, the RMB exchange rate would be a major issue to 
be discussed. On the following day, 8 April 2010, there was news that China would soon announce a 
change to its then exchange rate regime. 
13
 The CDS data are sourced from Bloomberg. 
